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Abstract 
 
This research examines the geographical distribution of behavior in line with social 
norms that are spread and maintained primarily by the effect of social conformity. These 
include widely held norms that good citizens vote, don’t commit crimes, get flu 
vaccinations, abstain from binge drinking, and comply with census reporting. A partial 
differential equation model is used to determine whether such behavior may have attained 
a geospatial equilibrium in the United States. An equilibrium, as the end state of a 
diffusion process, has definitive mathematical properties that can be used to test for 
equilibrium. This is done using recent data for the 48 contiguous states. Results confirm 
that behavior for several important social norms fits the equilibrium model 
geographically. Policy implications are briefly discussed.  
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 Geographical Distributions and Equilibrium in Social Norm-Related 
Behavior in the United States 
 
 
 
The focus of this analysis is the contemporary geographic distribution in the United 
States of a variety of behaviors that follow widely held social norms. These social norms, 
in turn, are maintained and spread by the influence of social conformity. When people see 
or learn about others’ behavior, they often begin to act like others because of their 
propensity for social conformity. The prevalent behavior then becomes the normative 
standard. Many people also conform their behavior to widely held public values, such as 
the norm that good citizens should vote in elections (Cialdini, 1993; Coleman, 2007a). In 
both cases, as Cialdini reports, people are increasingly likely to conform with others as 
the proportion of other people doing something increases. Even the thought that relatively 
more people are doing something is enough to prompt conformist behavior in many 
individuals. This is a self-limiting process, however, as not everyone can be brought into 
conformity. Conformity is not the only mechanism for the spread of social behaviors; 
people get information and ideas through personal contact and by learning from others. 
But only conformity directly involves large social groups and populations.  
 
Recent studies on conformity show important spatial effects. The willingness of people to 
comply with a norm, such as voting, recycling, obeying laws, or giving to charity, can 
vary significantly from place to place (Coleman, 2007a). And the degree of conformity 
with a norm can change when people in one area are influenced by the behavior of people 
in other locations. In a natural social context the influence of conformity on an individual 
is related to the distance from other people as well as to the relative number of people 
who may express a position or behavior. The joint influence of a group increases with a 
power function of the number (usually an exponent of about 0.5), but decreases 
approximately with the square of the distance to the individual (Nowak and Vallacher, 
1998: 225).  
 
Here the analysis examines geospatial models for several behaviors that may be strongly 
affected by social conformity: voter turnout in a U.S. presidential election; binge 
drinking; timely census reporting; weekly churchgoing; influenza vaccination, the rate of 
aggravated assaults, and income tax compliance. The units of analyses are the 48 
contiguous American states. Specifically, voter turnout is the percentage of those voting 
among the age-eligible population in 2008.1 Binge drinking, as measured in 2004 in a 
survey by the Centers for Disease Control, is the percentage of adults who had five or 
more drinks on one occasion.2 Timely census reporting refers to the percentage of 
households who voluntarily responded to the 2000 Census before census workers had to 
 
1
 United States Election Project, George Mason University, http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html. 
2
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey, Atlanta 
Georgia, 2004.  
contact them.3 Vaccination rate in 2009 is the percentage of adults vaccinated against 
H1N1 influenza by the end of January 2010, as estimated in a survey of the Department 
of Health and Human Services.4 Weekly or almost weekly churchgoing percentage from 
2004 to 2006 was determined by the Gallup Poll.5 Aggravated assaults are the most 
common violent crime, usually involving serious bodily harm; the rate is per 100,000 
population in 2008, as reported by local jurisdictions to the FBI.6 Tax compliance is the 
average percentage income from 1982 to1991 fully reported on federal income tax filings, 
as reported by the Internal Revenue Service.7  
 
Research backs up the connection between these social behaviors and social conformity. 
People vote mainly because of the widely held norm that good citizens should vote (Blais, 
2000; Coleman, 2004), and social pressure or information about others’ voting behavior 
can increase voting participation (Knack, 1992; Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008; 
Gerber and Rogers, 2009). Moreover,  people collectively tend to behave with a 
consistent degree of conformity in different situations, such as voting, abstaining from 
committing crimes, giving to charity, and answering the census. Knack and Kropf (1998) 
show this at the county level and Coleman (2002, 2007a) at the state and county levels. 
Similarly, churchgoing is commonly associated with adherence to prevalent social norms. 
The influence of conformity on binge drinking has been documented on college 
campuses; students are more likely to drink when others do it, or when they overestimate 
the drinking behavior of others (Perkins, 2003). Although little is known about the effect 
of conformity on adult flu vaccination, public health authorities are frequently in the 
news urging the public to get vaccinated, which may create a norm that good citizens get 
vaccinated to protect themselves and others. Conversely, childhood vaccination rates 
have been decreasing owing to the misleading spread of public views that childhood 
vaccinations cause autism. Public opinion also affects tax compliance. Experiments on 
income tax compliance show that people often overestimate the rate of tax cheating by 
others but will increase their compliance when given evidence that others do pay their 
taxes (Coleman 1996 and 2007b; Wenzel, 2001).  
 
Conformity operates at individual, group, and societal levels (Cialdini, 1993), so one 
would expect to see a spatial effect on behavior at higher levels of aggregation, such as 
neighborhoods, counties, states, or regions. Indeed, a growing number of studies 
demonstrate spatial effects on social and political behavior over larger areas. Tam Cho 
and Rudolph (2008) analyze political activities of individuals in and around large 
American cities. They conclude that a part of  the spatial pattern of behavior around cities 
is consistent with a diffusion model and cannot be reduced to socio-demographic 
differences in the population. Other spatial analyses showing broad regional or 
community effects, all with aggregate data, concern voter turnout in Italy (Shin, 2001; 
 
3
 U.S. Census Bureau, “Census 2000 Initial Response Rates,” updated April 19, 2000.  
4
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report;”  April,, 
2, 2010, Vol. 59, No. 12, pp 366-367.   
5
 Frank Newport, “Church Attendance Lowest in New England, Highest in South,” Gallup New Service, 
April 27, 2006. www. gallup.com/poll/22579/church-attendance-lowest-new-england-highest-south.aspx.  
6
 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2011, Table 304.  
7
 Internal Revenue Service, “The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance,”  Publication 1916, 
November 1996, Table E-2. 
Shin and Agnew, 2007), the Nazi vote in Germany in 1930 (O’Loughlin, Flint, and 
Anselin, 1994), and voting in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Calvo and Escolar, 2003). One 
also sees spatial effects at larger geographic scales in the diffusion or contagion of 
homicide rates (Cohen and Tita, 1999; Messner, et al., 1999); in collective violence such 
as riots (Myers, 2000); and in the negative association of lynching rates across Southern 
counties of the United States (Tolnay, Deane, and Beck, 1996).  
 
Models 
 
The direct study of the diffusion of social behaviors is very difficult, and one can more 
easily investigate whether the end state of a diffusion process has been attained, namely, 
if the spatial distribution is at an equilibrium state. This also alleviates the need for 
extensive time-series data. To investigate this possibility one starts with the mathematical 
model for spatial diffusion in two dimensions. In its most simple form this is 
 
ut =  D (uxx + uyy)                 (1) 
 
That is, the time derivative is equal to a diffusion constant D multiplied by the sum of the 
second partial derivatives of variable u along the spatial coordinates x and y; the function 
u(x,y,t) must be twice differentiable. The right side of the equation is known as the 
Laplacian operator. (The subscripted variables indicate differentiation.) Another 
interpretation is that the rate of change of u at point (x,y) at time t is proportional to the 
difference between u(x,y) and the average value of u around that point. Equation (1) is 
also known as the heat equation because it describes the flow of heat across a two-
dimensional surface. As the diffusion process evolves over time, eventually a steady state 
is reached, when ut =  0. The constant can be ignored in this case, so the equation, known 
as the Laplace equation, becomes  
 
uxx + uyy  =  0                 (2) 
 
 
To understand more about this equation and its solution, consider that one knows the 
value of u(x,y) on a two-dimensional lattice of points at a small equidistance h from one 
to the next with the lattice representing a geographical area. Initially any distribution of 
values is possible. One can approximate equation (2) on the lattice at point (m,n) by a 
Taylor expansion, which after dropping negligible terms leads to  
 
(1/h2) (um+1,n – 2 um,n + um-1,n)  +  (1/h2) (um,n+1 – 2 um,n + um,n-1)  = 0   (3) 
 
and thus 
 
um,n = ¼ (um+1,n + um,n+1 +um-1,n + um,n-1)      (4) 
 
So the value of u at each point on the lattice is approximately the average of the values at 
the four adjoining points on each side. This leads to a method for solving the equation 
numerically. 
 Conformity models. The numerical solution of the Laplace equation can be seen in a 
simple example. It uses a method of iteration known as a relaxation process. Assume, for 
example, that voter turnout u is known for the geographical center of each unit, that is, at 
each point on the lattice. Consider next how individuals in the center unit are influenced 
by turnout in the neighboring units. By the Nowak and Vallacher (1998) model and 
Cialdini’s (1993) research, influence is proportional to the relative frequency of people in 
neighboring units who are expected to vote. The neighboring units are equidistant from 
the center, so distance is not a factor. What might be the net result on voter turnout in the 
center unit? Suppose that two of the neighboring units have turnout 50% and two have 
70%. One would expect people in the center unit who are closer to the 50% neighbors to 
shift their voting behavior in that direction, while voters closer to the 70% areas would 
tend that way. So a commonsense prediction would be that turnout in the center would 
tend toward the average, 60%. For the moment consider as a working hypothesis that 
turnout in the center unit will be approximately the average of turnout in the neighboring 
units.   
 
More formally, let us express the idea that because of the influence of social conformity 
each unit becomes more like its neighbors, with the turnout at (xi, yj) tending toward the 
average turnout in the four neighbors. The units might have any turnout values initially. 
One can extrapolate what will happen in this arrangement by a mental or computer 
simulation. At each iteration one successively replaces the turnout value at each point by 
the average turnout of its four neighbors. That is, at each turn for every point let  
 
 u(xi,yj) = ¼ u(xi,yj+1) + ¼ u(xi+1,yj) + ¼ u(xi,yj-1) + ¼ u(xi-1,yj)    (5) 
 
If one does this simulation the result is that after some large number of iterations all units 
end up with the same turnout value. But this would be an unrealistic outcome. With one 
additional hypothesis, however, this becomes an interesting and realistic model, namely, 
that turnout values in the units on the geographic boundary of the country (or lattice) do 
not change, or at least change very little in relation to change in the interior. This seems 
reasonable because each boundary unit interacts with two neighbors that are also 
boundary units but with only one interior unit; change in the interior propagates slowly to 
the boundary. 
 
What can one say about the result of this model after a very large number of iterations? 
As it turns out, it is not necessary to simulate this on a computer to know the general 
form of the result. No matter what the initial turnout values are, or the boundary values, 
this model leads to a distribution of turnout values across the country or lattice that is 
unique and depends only on the values on the boundary. If the simulation continues until 
no further change occurs—the steady state—the distribution of turnout values fits a 
mathematical function u(x,y) known as a harmonic or potential function (Garabedian, 
1964: 458ff). It is this type of function that interests us, not the actual numerical values. 
Such a function is a solution of the Laplace equation (2). The analysis will test whether 
boundary values do indeed control the results and lead to a harmonic function distribution 
for social norms.  
 The solution of the Laplace equation for fixed boundary values is a famous problem of 
mathematics and physics. Finding the values across the interior is known as the Dirichlet 
problem.8 This was a very difficult for mathematicians of the 1800s to solve analytically, 
but more recently it was discovered that one can also solve the problem numerically by a 
computer simulation of the type just described (Garabedian, 1964: 485ff).9 This problem 
arises in physics when one tries to explain the effect of gravitation, electrostatic charge, 
or the diffusion of heat, across a distance on a surface or sphere. The analogy of heat 
diffusion fits best here as seen, for example, in the daily weather map that shows contours 
of temperature across the country. So as a standard of comparison, and to offer additional 
evidence that this method actually works, the analysis here includes the distribution of 
average state temperatures across the 48 states from 1971 to 2000.10 The averaging gives 
an approximation of the long-term climate equilibrium underlying seasonal temperature 
changes and other spatiotemporal temperature fluctuations (neglecting any mention of 
global warming).  
 
A harmonic function has unique properties (Kellogg, 1953): (1) The product of a 
harmonic function multiplied by a constant is harmonic (scale invariance), as is the sum 
or difference of two such functions. (2) It is invariant—still harmonic—under translation 
or rotation of the axes. (3) The function over an area is completely determined by the 
values on the boundary; the solution is unique. (4) A harmonic function over a closed, 
bounded area takes on its maximum and minimum values only on the boundary of the 
area (if it is not a constant). (5) If a function is harmonic over an area, the value at the 
center of any circle within the area equals the arithmetic average value of the function 
around the circle. This implies that averages around concentric circles are equal. The 
converse is also true. If the averages around all circles equal the values at their centers, 
the function is harmonic. Note also that the property of scale invariance implies that the 
size of the units of analysis should not matter much. Harmonic functions have many other, 
more complex properties as well.  
 
Examples of harmonic functions in two dimensions are: 
 
(1) A plane surface Ax + By + Cz +D = 0 for constants A, B, C, D 
(2) In polar coordinates,  f(r) = c/r or c/r2 
(3) f(x,y) = ln(x2 +y2) 
(4) f(x,y) = ex sin(y) 
(5) constant functions 
 
Because a harmonic function is the unique solution to the diffusion problem represented 
by the lattice model of social conformity, one can use properties of harmonic functions as 
approximate tests for the validity of the model. Here three properties of harmonic 
 
8Dirichlet’s interest in proving the stability of the solar system led to the study of harmonic functions.  
9The boundary must be fairly smooth. For  Monte Carlo solutions to the Laplace equation see Haji-Sheikh 
and Sparrow (1966). In 1944 Kakutani had showed that a numerical solution is also possible with random 
walks.  
10
 http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/data/usclimate/tmp.state.19712000.climo 
functions are tested: (1) that the geographical distribution of the function is a harmonic 
function; (2) that averages around concentric circles are equal; and (3) that the maximum 
and minimum of the distribution are in border areas. These hypotheses would be satisfied 
trivially if the distribution were constant; from a conservative approach to interpreting the 
results, this situation must be ruled out as well. And one must verify that the distribution 
in not random. A broad class of alternatives to the harmonic function can be tested with 
quadratic equations, such as u(x,y) = a x2 + b x +c or u(x,y) = a x2 + b x y + c y2 + d 
when a + b + c ≠ 0. If the geographic distribution fits these models, it is not harmonic. 
The analysis is limited, however, to testing these hypotheses with areal data, which has 
high granularity as to location. So the hypotheses must be adapted to fit this type of data.  
 
 
Spatial Analysis 
 
This analysis uses the geographical software GeoDa 0.9.5 developed primarily by Luc 
Anselin, who pioneered many of the methods used in spatial analysis. It uses the 
ArcView standard developed by ESRI, Inc. The software has good capabilities for 
comprehensive geographical analysis, including map drawing, spatial autocorrelation,  
regression, and special statistical tests. But it must be supplemented with a statistical 
program for more complex data manipulation and other statistical analysis. GeoDa is 
available at no charge via the Internet from Arizona State University.11 The working 
hypotheses of this spatial analysis are that distance matters and that being closer means a 
having a stronger effect, which is in accord with research on social conformity. 
 
The first task is to check that the spatial distribution of each variable is not random. The 
spatial autocorrelation is the correlation between the value in each state and the average 
of values in neighboring states. For this analysis the neighbors around each state are the 
set of states that have a boundary in common with it; this is called rook contiguity by 
analogy with chess. This is a gross approximation of the lattice model discussed earlier 
but is sufficient to begin testing the model. In the U.S. this identification of contiguous 
neighbors leads to different numbers for the states.12 The most common number of 
neighbors is four, and forty states have between three and six states sharing a border.  
 
Spatial autocorrelation for the entire country is assessed with Moran’s I. This is a 
measure of spatial autocorrelation with range [-1,1]. As with Pearson’s correlation, 
Moran’s I can be positive or negative, and a value near zero implies no autocorrelation. It 
is based on the aggregate of autocorrelations in the neighborhoods of all states. For 
example, when states with above average turnout are neighbors of states that also have 
above average turnout, the I value increases; the same holds when below average turnout 
states border other low turnout states. A seen in Table 1, all variables but tax compliance 
are statistically significant on this measure at p <.05; the distributions are not spatially 
random.  
 
11
 http://geodacenter.asu.edu 
12
 Because the boundary values completely determine the solution to the Laplace equation, it does not 
matter what the exact geometric arrangement of states is or how many share borders. This arrangement can 
affect the rate of convergence toward the steady-state solution, however.  
 Harmonic function test. If a variable’s geographic distribution is a solution to the Laplace 
equation, it should be a harmonic function of its location. Inspection of maps reveals that 
state distributions usually have a north-south gradient and sometimes an east-west tilt, 
suggesting that one can try to model the distribution as a function of latitude and, 
possibly, longitude. The map shapefile contains information on the longitude and latitude 
of the polygon used to map each state. For each state GeoDa can compute a centroid, 
which is the latitude-longitude location of the geometric center of gravity of the state. 
This location is used in the analysis. Table 2 shows the results of linear regression of 
turnout against latitude and, if significant, longitude at the state centroid.  
 
All the social norms except tax compliance and churchgoing are a linear function of their 
location at the centroid (Figures 1-6). These are harmonic functions of latitude and, for 
turnout, also longitude; namely, they are plane surfaces. The strongest fit is for voter 
turnout; the weakest is tax compliance, just missing statistical significance at p = .07. 
Churchgoing, however, is a function of latitude, longitude, and longitude squared and 
therefore not harmonic. Its distribution is approximately a convex quadratic surface with 
a north-south ridge at 95 degrees W longitude—about the longitude of Kansas City, 
Kansas and Houston, Texas; and it is also tilted so that church going is lower in the north 
than the south. One can infer that all the variables with plane distributions are close to a 
steady state but churchgoing is not. 
 
The analysis also checked to see whether the models captured the spatial lag effects. As 
seen in Table 2, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests indicate models where there is significant 
remaining spatial lag and whether there is error correlation between units. When spatial 
lag remains significant, it may indicate the effect of a missing variable or a biased 
coefficient estimate. This is particularly evident for churchgoing because the linear model 
in latitude does not adequately represent the curved surface of the distribution; the 
significance of the spatial lag term vanishes when all location terms are included (Table 2, 
note). Census reporting also shows remaining spatial lag or error, but if the spatial lag is 
included in its regression model, the explained variance increases to 0.42 and the 
coefficient of latitude has a smaller value (Table 2, note), which should be a better 
estimate. 
 
Because a harmonic distribution is completely determined by its boundary values, the 
analysis was redone for the 30 boundary states to verify that stipulation.13  Results are in 
Table 3. A comparison of models in Table 2 and 3 shows that the coefficients for latitude 
are statistically the same for assaults, flu vaccination, and binge drinking. Longitude is 
not significant for turnout in the boundary model, but the latitude coefficient is about the 
same, within a statistical margin, as the all state model. The tax compliance model is 
marginally more significant for boundary values (p = .04) but the coefficients are 
 
13
 Boundary states are: WA, OR, CA, AZ, NM, TX, LA, MS, AL, FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, MD, DE, NJ, NY, 
CT, RI, MA, VT, ME, OH, MI, WI, MN, IL, ND, MT. Interior states: ID, NV, UT, CO, WY, SD, OK, AK, 
IA, IN, KY, WV, TN, NH, PA, NE, KS, MO. States with very short national boundaries--Idaho, Indiana 
and Pennsylvania--are classified as interior states.  
 
different. One can infer that assaults, vaccination and binge drinking show the strongest 
evidence of an equilibrium by this test, with turnout close behind.  
 
Mean-value test for concentric circles. This hypothesis can be tested approximately by 
comparing the averages in the interior states with the average over the boundary states. A 
t-test shows that there is no statistically significant difference in means between boundary 
and interior states for all the variables except tax compliance. A comparison of means is 
in Table 4. The analysis was redone with a nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, 
which compares rankings of the each variable between boundary and interior states. This 
result shows that none of the variables had a statistically significant shift in the ranked 
distributions of boundary versus interior states. 
 
Maximum and minimum test. The third test is that the maximum and minimum for a 
harmonic function should be on the border. Table 5 shows the states where these occur in 
their empirical distributions. Taxpaying had the poorest fit to the harmonic model and 
both its maxima and minima are interior states (Utah and South Dakota); this is consistent 
with its weak fit in the harmonic function test. Iowa and Tennessee are exceptions for 
census reporting (maximum) and binge drinking (minimum), respectively. One can 
obtain the statistical probability of these findings from the binomial distribution. The 
probability of either a maximum or minimum being a boundary state is 30/48 = .625. 
Excluding tax compliance and temperature, the chance of having exactly 10 correct 
predictions of 12 is p = .08. One might say this supports the hypothesis but not beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
  
Discussion 
 
The analysis shows that several important behaviors are influenced by social norms—
voting, aggravated assaults, flu vaccination, binge drinking, and census reporting. They 
have a definitive geographical pattern in the United States. Their distribution fits a 
harmonic function model, representative of a solution to the Laplace equation and an 
equilibrium at the end of a diffusion process. The spatial distributions have a north-south 
gradient, and for turnout also a east-to-west slant; the churchgoing distribution is not 
harmonic but fits a quadratic surface.  
 
The spatial distributions closest to a harmonic function are approximately in a steady 
state at this time, so one should not expect substantial changes in their distribution in the 
foreseeable future. This prospect also suggests that public policies designed, for instance, 
to reduce binge drinking or increase vaccination rates would be difficult to accomplish. 
The exception to this is weekly churchgoing. One might anticipate future change in this 
behavior, which would imply a decrease in churchgoing in central and south-central 
regions. The boundary state model for churchgoing suggests the likely eventual 
equilibrium. Tax compliance barely fits the model, if at all. This likely represents the fact 
that people generally do not know the prevailing behavioral norm for tax compliance. 
Because an individual’s tax paying is private and kept secret by the government, there is 
no public knowledge about this. Experiments show, however, that people who tend to 
overestimate the degree of  tax cheating are less likely to cheat when given correct 
information about its prevalence (Coleman, 1996, 2007b).  
 
The finding that adult influenza vaccination also fits the model is intriguing and calls for 
further research because of its implications for public health campaigns. A high 
vaccination rate is necessary to stop an epidemic. The spatial distribution does not match 
up with the incidence of influenza, however, which means that the spatial distribution is 
not simply a response to the illness. Flu epidemics have a seasonal wave pattern, not a 
steady-state spatial distribution, and annual outbreaks tend to spread from west to east, 
not along the north-south gradient of the vaccination pattern (Wenger and Naumova, 
2010). 
 
References 
 
 
Blais, A. (2000). To vote or not to vote: The merits and limits of rational choice theory. 
 Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Calvo, E. and Escolar, M. (2003). The local voter: A geographically weighted approach 
 to ecological inference. American Journal of Political Science, 47, 189-204. 
 
Cialdini, R.B. (1993). Influence: Science and practice. 3rd ed. N.Y.: Harper Collins. 
 
Cohen, J. and Tita, G. (1999). Diffusion in homicide: Exploring a general method for 
 detecting spatial diffusion processes. Journal of quantitative criminology, 15, 
 451-493. 
 
Coleman, S. (1996). The Minnesota income tax compliance experiment: State tax results. 
 Minnesota Department of Revenue, St. Paul, MN.  
 
Coleman, S. (2002). A test for the effect of social conformity on crime rates using voter 
 turnout. Sociological quarterly, 43, 257-276. 
 
Coleman, S. (2004). The effect of social conformity on collective voting behavior. 
 Political analysis, 12, 76-96. 
 
Coleman, S. (2007a). Popular delusions: How social conformity molds society and 
 politics. Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press. 
 
Coleman, S. (2007b). The Minnesota income tax compliance experiment: Replication of 
 the social norms experiment. SSRN paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393292. 
 
Garabedian, P.R. (1964). Partial differential equations. New York: Wiley.  
 
Gerber, A., Green, D.P, and Larimer, C. (2008). Social pressure and voter turnout: 
 Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. American political science review, 
 102, 33-48.  
 
Gerber, A. and Rogers, T. (2009). Descriptive social norms and motivation to vote: 
 Everybody’s voting and so should you . Journal of politics, 71, 178-191.  
 
Haji-Sheikh, A. and Sparrow, E.M. (1966). The floating random walk and its application 
 to Monte Carlo solutions of heat equations. SIAM Journal of applied 
 mathematics,14, 370-389. 
 
Kellogg, O.D. (1953). Foundations of potential theory. New York: Dover. 
 
Knack, S. (1992). Civic norms, social sanctions, and voter turnout. Rationality and 
 society, 4, 133-156. 
 
Knack, S., and Kropf, M.E. (1998). For shame! The effect of community cooperative 
 context and the probability of voting. Political psychology, 19, 585-599. 
 
Messner, S.F., Anselin, L., Baller, R.D., Hawkins, D.F., Deane, G., and Tolnay, S.E. 
 (1999). The spatial patterning of county homicide rates: An application of 
 exploratory data analysis. Journal of quantitative criminology, 15, 423-450. 
 
Myers, D.J., (2000). The diffusion of collective violence: Infectiousness, susceptibility, 
 and mass media networks. The American journal of sociology, 106, 173-208. 
 
Nowak, A. and Vallacher, R.R, (1998). Dynamical social psychology. New York: 
 Guilford Press. 
 
O’Loughlin, J., Flint, C., and Anselin, L. (1994). The geography of the Nazi vote: 
 Context, confession, and class in the Reichstag election of 1930. Annals of the 
 association of American geographers, 84, 351-380. 
 
Perkins, H.W. (2003). The social norms approach to preventing school and college age 
 substance abuse: A handbook for educators, counselors, and clinicians. New 
 York: Jossey-Bass.  
 
Shin, M.E. (2001). The politicization of place in Italy. Political geography,  20, 331-352. 
 
Shin, M.E., and Agnew, J. (2007). The geographical dynamics of Italian electoral change. 
 Electoral studies, 26, 287-302. 
 
Tam Cho, W. and Rudolph, T.J. (2008). Emanating political participation: Untangling the 
 spatial structure behind participation. British journal of political science, 38. 273-
 289. 
 
Tolnay, S.E., Deane, G., Beck, E.M. (1996). Vicarious violence: Spatial effects of 
 Southern lynchings. The American journal of sociology, 102, 788-815. 
 
Wenger, J.B. and Naumova, E.N. (2010). Seasonal synchronization of influenza in the 
 United States older adult population. PLoS ONE 5(4): 
 10187.doi:10.371/jounal.pone.0010187. 
 
Wenzel, M. (2001). Misperceptions of social norms about tax compliance (2): A field 
 experiment. Working Paper No.8. The Australian National University/Australian 
 Taxation Office. http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/8.pdf. 
 
Table 1. Moran’s test for spatial autocorrelation. 
 
Variable Moran’s I p value 
Average temperature 1971-
2000 
.74 .001 
Churchgoers 2004-06 .62 .001 
Census responders 2000 .46 .001 
Binge drinkers 2004 .43 .001 
Voter turnout 2008 .41 .001 
Flu vaccinated 2009 .36 .001 
Agg. assault rate 2008 .15 .04 
Tax compliance 1982-91 .15 .06 
Note: p value determined by permutation test. Turnout, churchgoers, census responders, binge drinkers, tax 
compliance, and flu vaccinations are percentages. Crime rate is per 100,000 population.   
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2. Harmonic function test model: Y = constant + b1* Latitude + b2 * Longitude 
 
Variable Constant 
(error) 
 b1 
(error) 
b2 
(error) 
R 
square 
p  LM 
spatial 
lag p 
LM 
spatial 
error p 
Average. 
Temperature 
111 (3.2) -1.50 
(0.08) 
ns .88 <.0001 .18 .006 
Turnout 
2008 
39.2 (7.0) 0.81 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
.45 <.0001 .40 .05 
Assaults 
2008 
853 (117)  -15.0 
(2.96) 
ns .36 <.0001 .10 .07 
Census 46.2 (4.3) 0.47 
(0.11) 
ns .28 <.0001 .007 .01 
Flu vac. -1.88 
(6.33) 
0.67 
(0.16) 
ns .27   .0001 .12 .22 
Churchgoers 80.7 
(11.8) 
-1.01 
(0.25) 
ns .27   .0008 <.0001 <.0001 
Binge 
drinkers 
1.88 
(3.20) 
0.33 
(0.08) 
ns .26   .0002 .04 .10 
Tax 
compliance 
74.0 (2.9) ns 0.59 
(0.31) 
.07   .06 .51 .52 
Notes: Latitude and longitude are at the state’s centroid. Full churchgoing model is Y = -166 (41) - 0.58 
(0.20) Latitude – 5.01 (0.81) Longitude – 0.0264 (0.0043) Longitude2 , for which R square = .60; LM 
spatial lag p = .16; LM spatial error p = .46. Full census model, Y = 22.9 (8.3) + 0.27 (0.11) latitude + 0.48 
(0.15) spatial lag, R square = 0.42.
 Table 3. Harmonic function test model for boundary states (N = 30):  
Y = constant + b1 * Latitude + b2 * Longitude. 
 
 
Variable Constant 
(error) 
 b1 (error) b2 (error) R square p  
Average 
Temperature 
111 (3.3) -1.48 
(0.08) 
ns .92 <.0001 
Churchgoers 154 (48) -0.60  
(0.21) 
4.8 (0.9) .67 <.0001 
Turnout 
2008 
31.7 (6.7) 0.71 (0.17) ns .38  .0003 
Assaults 
2008 
785 (140) -13.3 (3.5) ns .34 .0007 
Census 46.4 (36.4) 0.45 (0.20) ns .32 .001 
Flu vac. -2.08 (7.34) 0.67 (0.18)  .32 .001 
Binge 
drinkers 
3.28 (2.95) 0.30 (0.07) ns .30 .002 
Tax 
compliance 
74.6 (2.5) ns 0.060 
(0.028) 
.14 .04 
 
 
Table 4. Mean values for boundary and interior states. 
 
Variable Boundary Mean Interior Mean 
Average temperature 53.0 50.5 
Census reporting 63.9 65.9 
Binge drinking 15.2 14.2 
Flu vaccination 24.5 24.3 
Churchgoers 41.1 44.3 
Assaults 262 258 
Voter turnout 59.7 58.4 
Tax compliance 69.3 67.4 
 Table 5. Location of state maxima and minima. 
 
Variable Maximum Minimum 
Avg. temperature Florida North Dakota 
Churchgoers Louisiana New Hampshire 
Turnout 2008 Minnesota Texas 
Binge drinking Wisconsin Tennessee 
Flu vaccination Rhode Island Mississippi 
Census reporting Iowa South Carolina 
Assaults 2008 South Carolina Maine 
Tax compliance Utah South Dakota 
 
 
|Fig.1. Voter turnout in 2008 in relation to latitude with a linear fit.  
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Fig. 2. Census reporting in relation to latitude with a linear fit.  
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Fig 3. Binge drinking in relation to latitude with a linear fit.  
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Fig. 4. Flu vaccination in relation to latitude with a linear fit.  
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Fig. 5. Aggravated assault rate in relation to latitude with linear fit. 
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Figure 6. Churchgoing in relation to longitude with quadratic fit.  
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